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lsevier1. Introduction
Ubiquitous computing is revolutionizing the way humans
interact with machines and carry out everyday tasks. Through
the use of sensors, actuators and context awareness the virtual
world is highly intermingled with the physical world, creating
profound opportunities for enabling computationally smart
spaces with automation, seamless interactions and everywhere
anytime services. Information security in such environments
that spread across the virtual and physical environments con-
tinues to be challenging yet underdeveloped. Many approaches
either ignore security issues altogether or try to apply tradi-
tional mechanisms that do not lend themselves well to the
highly dynamic and truly distributed nature of ubiquitous
computing environments. This is particularly true for access
control mechanisms, as traditional mechanisms need some
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rely on reference monitors or other primitives to mediate every
attempted access by a user. Such solutions do not blend well
with the highly distributed, dynamic and context aware nature
of ubiquitous computing environments. In this work, we intro-
duce a context-aware access control mechanism that utilizes
threshold cryptography and multilayer encryption to provide
a dynamic and truly distributed method for access control.
This mechanism is closely coupled with the context-capturing
services and security policy service resulting in a fully con-
text-aware and seamless access control mechanism for typical
ubiquitous computing scenarios.
Researchers have begun to study how context and ubiqui-
tous computing can make hospitals and healthcare networks
more efﬁcient work environments (Bardam et al., 2004; Holz-
inger, 2005). One area where context may help is in deﬁning
data access policies. Hospitals and healthcare networks are
environments, where information security mechanisms are
not effective because policies focus on efﬁciency instead of data
protection. Recent headlines report that 15 hospital workers
were ﬁred because they reviewed Nadia Suleman’s (aka Octo-
mom) patient record without permission (http://www.fox-
news.com; http://www.healthleadersmedia.com). In a similar
privacy breach at a UCLA hospital, information related to
Farrah Fawcett’s cancer treatment was given to the National
Enquirer. As a result, 165 employees with positions ranging
from doctors to orderlies were ﬁred, suspended or warned
(http://www.foxnews.com). The lack of privacy and conﬁden-
tiality of patient records is not a new problem. In 1995, 24 peo-
ple in Maryland were indicted for selling patient information
from the state’s Medicaid database to four HMOs (Woodard,
1995). As stated by Woodard (1995), the biggest threat to dig-
ital patient records is conﬁdentiality. ‘‘Even before the intro-
duction of the computer, conﬁdentiality deteriorated as care
provided by large groups became more common. But comput-
erized records, particularly if embedded in large networks de-
signed to collect comprehensive lifelong data, can rapidly
accelerate that trend’’ (Woodard, 1995).
As reported in 1995 (Woodard, 1995) and even today, most
hospitals and healthcare networks allow all staff to access dig-
ital patient records even when the person does not have direct
care responsibility for the patient. While advocates argue that
unrestricted access is more efﬁcient, such access limits the
effectiveness of security mechanisms like passwords and
encryption. As evidenced by previous breaches, healthcare per-
sonnel sale information, share passwords and use other means
to subvert the system. Passwords and encryption do not re-
strict the behavior of authorized users. Therefore, we propose
to supplement the use of these mechanisms with contextual
information that determine when and under what conditions
a patient’s record can be accessed by individuals who do not
have direct care responsibility for the patient. For example,
when a patient’s doctor or nurse is not available, any staff doc-
tor or nurse should be allowed to view the patient’s record to
administer care. Additionally, when a medical emergency oc-
curs, any doctor or nurse should be able to access patient
information.
In this paper, we offer that security mechanisms used within
the proper context can ensure conﬁdentiality policies as well as
meet requirements for efﬁciency. ‘‘Context is any information
that can be used to characterize the situation of an entity. An
entity is a person, place, or object that is considered relevantto the interaction between a user and an application, including
the user and applications themselves’’ (Dey, 2001). In this pa-
per, we incorporate threshold cryptography into the context-
based encryption mechanism presented in Al-Muhtadi et al.
(2006). In this work, we extend the use of context to provide
context and location-based security mechanisms for providing
conﬁdentiality and restricting access. We envision context being
used in conjunction with identity and roles to provide context-
based encryption services, which provide ﬁner-grain access con-
trol services and efﬁcient key management for group communi-
cation. Encrypting ﬁles mitigates the need for complicated
access control mechanisms or reference monitors that mediate
every attempted access by a user. This advantage is even more
crucial in a ubiquitous computing environment, where it is com-
mon to have different pieces of data stored on a plethora of dif-
ferent devices with various capabilities and processing powers.
These can include lightweight devices such as PDAs, smart
phones, and smart watches. In such a setting, it is infeasible to
implement sophisticated access control checks on these devices.
We use threshold cryptography to provide a mechanism for
deﬁning how high-level context information is interpreted, and
to provide a secure mechanism for enforcing that interpreta-
tion. Our novel use of threshold cryptography as a mean for
capturing contextual information for access control decisions
enables us to leverage the dynamic nature of context to support
ﬂexible access control policies and to distribute trust among
components within the ubiquitous computing infrastructure.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 presents our approach and an overview of threshold
cryptography. In Section 3 we present a detailed description
of our system architecture. Section 4 presents the related work.
In Section 5 we present a motivating scenario and access con-
trol policy. Section 6 presents the implementation and evalua-
tion and we conclude in Section 7.2. Approach
In this paper, we use threshold cryptography to enable con-
text-aware access control. Context-aware access control
merges data from multiple context sensors and uses this data
to determine whether users should be given access to context
restricted resources. Our context-aware access control scheme
extends the context-based encryption scheme that is presented
in Al-Muhtadi et al. (2006). In Al-Muhtadi et al. (2006),
encryption is used to restrict access to data resources. Access
to resources is limited to users within a speciﬁc geographic re-
gion. Location data is used to determine whether data should
be decrypted or not. The decrypted data is then given to users
whose location has been veriﬁed.
To enable context-aware access control, we introduce the
idea of encrypting sensitive data using the secret-sharing mech-
anism (threshold cryptography, which we will refer to as TC
from now on) which is based on the idea of sharing a secret be-
tween different entities. A secret is divided into a number of se-
cret shares. In order to derive the secret, a pre-speciﬁed
number of entities must collaborate to obtain the secret.
Threshold schemes are (k-out-of-n), where n is the total num-
ber of all entities and k is the pre-speciﬁed number of entities
which must join forces to derive a secret. Variants of RSA
cryptographic algorithms utilized the idea of threshold
schemes by sharing the private key as the secret resulting in
Data
K TC
Kg
(a) An encryption layer based 
on secret -sharing, which can only 
be decrypted if the right high-
level context is realized
Data
K
KTC2
TC1
(b) Both encryption layers 
are based on secret-sharing, 
one is for the context and the 
other is for the subjects
Figure 1 Multi-layer encryption.
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for threshold schemes which are used mostly in RSA crypto-
graphic algorithms. They are either single sharing threshold
based on Lagrange’s interpolation as proposed by Shamir
(1979) or threshold sharing functions like geometric based
threshold as in Desmedt and Frankel (1990). In this project,
we adopt Shamir secret sharing scheme which is based on poly-
nomial interpolation. Assuming that the secret (d) is a number,
to divide d into pieces di; we pick a random k  1 degree
polynomial:
fðxÞ ¼ a0 þ a1xþ    þ ak1xk1 where a0 ¼ d:
Given any subset k of these (i, f(i)), the coefﬁcients of f(x)
can be found by interpolation and evaluate f(0) which is d.
But knowledge of just k  1 is not enough to calculate d. In or-
der to restrict access to data until a higher-level contextual sit-
uation is realized, we identify the various low-level sensor data
that the higher-level context situation can be derived from, in a
similar fashion to what was done in previous work (Rangana-
than et al., 2004). For example, if enough sensors in a smart
space provide readings that are consistent with a meeting activ-
ity in the space, then this should be enough to assume a meet-
ing is taking place, and thus access to data can be granted. It is
possible to add multiple layers of encryption to capture richer
access control policies. For example, some sensitive data can
only be decrypted when a speciﬁc number of authorized users
(k-out-of-n) are in the right location or under the right contex-
tual situation. Sometimes it might be necessary to accommo-
date scenarios where several conditions must be present to
grant access to the data, in which case, we can select an n-
out-of-n secret sharing scheme for the TC layer, assuming
the accuracy of all these sensors are sufﬁcient. Alternatively,
it is possible to introduce two layers of encryption, where the
ﬁrst layer consists of the required conditions and uses an n-
out-of-n scheme, and the other layer consists of these condi-
tions that do not need to be satisﬁed fully for granting access,
and thus, using a k-out-of-n scheme as illustrated in Fig. 1.
3. System architecture
In this section we give a brief overview on how our mechanism
works. Our system consists of a general-purpose distributed
middleware, made up from distributed components that are
developed using Java RMI. These components provide the
common core functionality for enabling smart spaces and their
applications. The main components include a policy service,
context service, and event service. The policy service managessecurity policies and encryption keys. The context service pro-
cesses sensor data to derive high level context. The event service
provides secure communication among components within the
system. Fig. 2 provides an architectural overview of the system.
Component details are provided in the following subsections.
3.1. Policy service
The policy service provides primitives for security administra-
tors to create and manage security policies for the smart space
environment. Security policies are layered. Each layer of a
security policy has at least one corresponding contextual con-
dition. The policy service generates an encryption key for each
layer and encrypts the data. The policy service decomposes
into n key shares, where n corresponds to the number of con-
textual conditions that are associated with a layer. The policy
service then distributes these key shares to sensor brokers with-
in the smart space environment. Each layer of the security pol-
icy is sent to a context manager. Sensor brokers and context
managers are components within the context service. Descrip-
tions of these components are provided below.
3.2. Context service
The context service captures and processes contextual informa-
tion from various sensors. Various contextual information are
captured using various sensors, like temperature, lighting lev-
els, sound levels, time and date, schedule, patient vital signs,
etc. High-level activities (e.g., a closed meeting taking place
in a speciﬁc room, etc.) can be implied by fusing sensors or
gathering raw data from various sensors, and deriving high-
er-level contextual information. For example, if the environ-
ment is able to detect the presence of several people, who are
sitting at a large table in a room and talking in an orderly fash-
ion, then this could imply that a meeting is taking place. The
context service supports deducing high-level activities from
low-level sensors.
The design of the context service is based on the ideas out-
lined by Ranganathan et al. (2004) and Ranganathan and
Campbell (2003). The context service middleware consists of
two components, context managers and sensor brokers. The
context managers use ﬁrst order logic to reason about contex-
tual situations and derive higher-level or abstract contexts from
sensor data. Sensor brokers mediate access to data produced by
sensors and provide primitives for enabling communication
with other components and services in a smart space infrastruc-
ture. For lightweight sensors, sensor brokers are simply a ded-
icated PC on which the sensor’s component runs. Sensor
brokers store the key shares of the corresponding sensors.
A context manager is responsible for deriving the higher-le-
vel context that corresponds to a layer of encryption. When a
context manager receives k decryption shares from the sensor
brokers, the manager removes one layer of encryption. The
process repeats until all layers are removed. The decrypted
data is sent back to the user. If an insufﬁcient number of con-
ditions are met, the data cannot be decrypted and the access
operation fails. Fig. 3 illustrates this process.
3.3. Event service
Another key component is the event service that allows events
to be communicated between distributed objects. The event
Subject 
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Figure 3 The use of TC for context-based access control.
Figure 2 Architectural overview.
74 J. Al-Muhtadi et al.service utilizes a publish-subscribe model for dispersing events.
With the event service, users can create secure event channels
where channel participants are restricted to authorized entities
and sensitive events are encrypted, as described in Lee et al.
(2005). All relevant sensor components within the smart space
infrastructure are connected through a special secure event
channel as depicted in Fig. 3. A detailed description of
Fig. 3 is provided below.
Step 1: Once the security policy for accessing sensitive data
is speciﬁed, a security ofﬁcer can specify the necessaryconditions that satisfy the high-level context or the identity
and/roles of subject(s) that are authorized to access that data.
This will depend on the sensitivity of the information and the
sensor availability and setup in the smart space.
Step 2: Once the requirements for access are speciﬁed, the
secret shares are generated according to Shamir’s secret shar-
ing scheme. Using a secure end-to-end connection over an
event channel, the secret shares are distributed to the compo-
nents of the relevant sensors, as well as meta-data to identify
the condition that needs to be met for a given sensor compo-
nent (or a context synthesizer component) to apply its share
to the data. An encryption ‘‘layer’’ can now be added to the
data. The encrypted data is stored in the Distributed Storage
Service (DSS) – the DSS implements functionality similar to
a ﬁle system in a traditional OS, with the addition of con-
text-awareness and support for data distribution across vari-
ous smart devices and the cloud, i.e., encrypted data can be
stored at different locations, including PDAs or the cloud,
yet the DSS manages to aggregate the data so that it virtually
appears to be stored on a single location (Hess, 2002).
Steps 3 and 4: When a subject requests access to the data,
the data is ﬁrst sent to the event channel of the sensors’ com-
ponent. Each sensor will apply its share to the encrypted data
if the appropriate context is realized. If enough sensors partic-
ipate, that layer of encryption is removed.
Step 5: If the TC layer is successfully removed, then the
remaining data is passed to the subject. It is possible to have
multiple layers of encryption here, where each layer needs to
be decrypted to access the data. The inner layer can be con-
cerned with validating the identity or the role of the requestor.
Patient Information
Layer 1: Doctor Authorization
Layer 2: Location verification
Layer 3: Patient Status / 
Operating Conditions 
Figure 4 Multi-layer encryption.
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to access the data, the inner layer can also be based on a secret
sharing scheme, as illustrated in Fig. 1b.
The beneﬁts of this scheme is that trust is distributed rather
than trusting a single entity for making decisions on whether
the higher-level context is realized or not. In addition, it allows
the system to cope with some level of uncertainty if some sen-
sors are unable to give accurate readings.
In addition to applying TC to context, we can employ TC
techniques to add an additional layer of encryption to data
stored on the DSS or transmitted over event channels. This
data can only be decrypted when a speciﬁc number of autho-
rized users (k-out-of-n) are in the right location or under the
right contextual situation. Sometimes it might be necessary
to accommodate scenarios where several conditions must be
present to grant access to the data, in which case, we can select
an n-out-of-n secret sharing scheme for the TC layer, assuming
the accuracy of all these sensors are sufﬁcient. Alternatively, it
is possible to introduce two layers of encryption, where the
ﬁrst layer consists of the required conditions and uses an n-
out-of-n scheme, and the other layer consists of these condi-
tions that do not need to be satisﬁed fully for granting access,
and thus, using a k-out-of-n scheme.4. Motivating scenario
To address the problem of ensuring patient privacy, health
information systems in a smart hospital environment should re-
quire delicate security and privacy policies. Patient records
should be kept secure and only accessible under speciﬁc circum-
stances that can be speciﬁed at a ﬁne level of granularity. Such
ﬁne grain mechanisms are not currently employed because of
concerns for timely and efﬁcient access to medical records.
Security mechanisms should not delay or prohibit patient care.
To this end, we deﬁne a complex security policy to test the per-
formance bounds of the threshold cryptography scheme. We do
not suggest that the policy is viable for hospital environments,
but use it only to illustrate that our approach is efﬁcient even
when used to implement complex security policies.
4.1. Access policy
To assess the performance and the practicality of our approach
we simulate a smart hospital emergency scenario and apply
our approach for dynamic access control. First we assume a
three tier policy for data access within our environment. A tier
maps to a layer of encryption within our scheme, and the pol-
icy that corresponds to the tier deﬁnes the context that must be
satisﬁed before the corresponding layer of encryption is re-
moved. We begin my describing the policy at layer 3 which
is the outer most layer and conclude with layer 1.
Layer 3 – The policy at layer three speciﬁes when a patient’s
records may be viewed: The patient’s records may be viewed
by a doctor when the patient is being admitted to the hospital,
or during the hours that the doctor makes his/her rounds, or if
the patient is experiencing a medical emergency. Examples of a
medical emergency would be: heart rate is over or under a pre-
speciﬁed threshold, high temperature, high blood pressure or
any other vital signs. During our simulation, one of the speci-
ﬁed conditions must be met before the outermost encryption
layer can be removed.Layer 2 – The policy at layer two concerns the location of
patient and doctor: The patient’s records may be viewed when
both the doctor and patient are located within the hospital and
the doctor is within the patient’s room or in close proximity to
the patient. During our simulation, both conditions must be
met before the second layer of encryption can be removed.
Layer 1 – The policy at layer one concerns verifying the
doctor’s identity and credentials: The doctor may view a pa-
tient’s records if he is the attending physician, or he is the
charge physician, who is ﬁlling in for the attending physician,
and he is afﬁliated with the hospital. During our simulation at
least two of the conditions must be met before the ﬁnal layer of
encryption is removed.
Fig. 4 illustrates the idea of the multi-layer encryption.
Using our mechanism, for the patient’s information to be
decrypted, each layer should be decrypted (peeled off) only if
the right context is realized. This is managed by the policy ser-
vice which executes the security policy to decrypt the informa-
tion. Decryption starts with the outermost layer and proceeds
if the conditions are met at each successive layer. The patient’s
records are fully decrypted and made available to the doctor
via mobile device if all conditions are met.
5. Implementation and evaluation
Shoup (1999) proposed a practical RSA threshold signature
and decryption scheme that is based on Shamir secret sharing
scheme. We adopt this algorithm. Our implementation is
based on an open source implementation (Weis, 2006), which
we improved by adding decryption capabilities and other
enhancements. All services and objects are implemented as
standalone distributed objects using Java RMI. We use secure
event channels for secure communication between the various
objects. For our evaluation purposes we run all components
on an Intel Core 2 Duo 2.4 GHz machine and we simulate
a variety of contextual information to test the system. We fo-
cus on simulating and testing the smart hospital scenario that
was described in the previous section. The scenario perfor-
mance is evaluated using four ﬁle sizes for patient data;
200, 500, 1000 and 5000 bytes. For each conﬁguration, 20
readings are taken and averaged. We evaluated for three dif-
ferent key sizes. Two time measurements were recorded for
the performance of the scenario: (1) ‘‘with transmission time,’’
which measures the total time taken from the issuance of a
decryption request until the decrypted data is received (in-
cludes processing and data transmission, etc.), (2) ‘‘without
transmission time,’’ where we do not take into account data
transfer time, as we are trying to focus on cryptographic
Table 1 Smart hospital scenario with key sizes 128, 256 and
512 bit for layer 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
File size (bytes) 200 500 1000 5000
Without transmission time (ms) 341 369 348 372
With transmission time (ms) 499 533 526 554
Table 2 Smart hospital scenario with key sizes 256, 512 and
1024 bit for layer 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
File size (bytes) 200 500 1000 5000
Without transmission time (ms) 2339 2363 2368 2367
With transmission time (ms) 3189 3215 3232 3233
Table 3 Smart hospital scenario with key sizes 512, 1024 and
2048-bit for layer 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
File size (bytes) 200 500 1000 5000
Without transmission time (ms) 16,757 17,315 15,928 18,337
With transmission time (ms) 22,574 23,125 21,759 24,188
76 J. Al-Muhtadi et al.speed evaluation and ignore data transmission between dis-
tributed objects as the latter is very dependent on connectionFigure 5 Smart hospital scenario performance without transmission
Figure 6 Smart hospital scenario performance with transmission timtype, bandwidth and latency. Results of the evaluation are
shown in Tables 1–3 and Figs. 5 and 6.6. Model security analysis
The primary goal of proposed framework is to control access
to information thus ensuring privacy and conﬁdentiality of
information. Information will be disclosed only when a certain
pre-speciﬁed, context-aware, access policy is realized. In this
section, we review the security of the model by analyzing the
viable threats to the system.
The security policy deﬁnition process involves the distribu-
tion of policy key shares and creation of event channels. Pos-
sible threats include theft of key shares, and thus,
impersonating sensor brokers. Another threat could be eaves-
dropping on the event channel communication, and thus,
being able to combine decryption shares returned from the sen-
sor brokers in order to come up with the decrypted data. These
threats are addressed as follows. The key shares are encrypted
symmetrically using AES-128 (or better) with the pre-speciﬁed
context conditions’ keys. Event channel communication is se-
cured using symmetric encryption with a group key. The group
key is exchanged with the event channel’s subscribers after
authentication is established by asymmetrically encrypting it
with the subscribers’ public key.
Possible threats during the data decryption phase include
the faking of context data at the sensor side when it is re-
quested by the sensor broker and attacking the key shares stor-time.
e.
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ensuring that communication between sensor brokers and sen-
sors is secured through mutual authentication and the use of
encryption, thus making it difﬁcult to send fake sensor data.
The key shares stored at the sensor brokers are safely kept be-
cause they are already encrypted by the pre-speciﬁed context
conditions’ keys.
Furthermore, in the proposed framework, the level of trust
assigned to sensor brokers is distributed and not centralized at
one place. If an attacker was able to fake one sensor’s data it
would have a limited effect on the access control decision, since
the model is using threshold cryptography (k-out of-n) and a
number of k context conditions will have to be realized for
the data to be decrypted. The same applies if an attacker
was able to impersonate a certain sensor broker. This also
makes the system resilient to some level to a limited number
of faulty sensors.7. Related work
Much recent work on access control systems for ubiquitous
and pervasive computing has been based on the Role-based
Access Control system (Sandhu et al., 1996) (RBAC). RBAC
relies on the principle that access control decisions are based
on the roles individuals take on as part of an organization.
The key concept in RBAC is a role, which is a placeholder
for a set of users. Each role is associated with a set of permis-
sions, which are its rights on objects. These roles may be orga-
nized into a hierarchy to reﬂect the organizational hierarchy
among different users in a system. RBAC has been adapted
for use in pervasive computing environments (Gill et al.,
2001; Viswanatha, 2001; Covington et al., 2000), and the con-
cept of roles is extended to deal with context information.
However, RBAC is not sufﬁciently ﬂexible to handle spontane-
ous changes in context in an optimized manner. Furthermore,
RBAC requires a separate mechanism to enforce the access
decisions, in the form of a reference monitor to something sim-
ilar. The Aware Home project has extended RBAC with object
and environment roles (Covington et al., 2000, 2001, 2002)
that are used to deﬁne context-aware security policies such
as those based on temporal authorizations. However, they
do not address permissions under speciﬁc high-level contextual
situations. Kumar (2001) also consider incorporating context
into the RBAC model with contexts and context ﬁlters.
dRBAC (Freudenthal et al., 0000) is a decentralized trust-man-
agement and access control mechanism for systems spanning
multiple administrative domains.8. Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we present a novel framework that enables con-
text-aware access control via the use of encryption and thresh-
old cryptography. The approach is novel in that it combines
the use of TC and heterogeneous high-level contexts to make
an access control decision. In addition, trust is distributed
throughout the ubiquitous computing infrastructure. We be-
lieve that contextual awareness can enrich traditional security
mechanisms with greater ﬂexibility and expressiveness power
and enable a variety of security services. Our simulations show
that our multilayered access control mechanisms can operate
efﬁciently even for complex scenarios and increasing key sizes.In this work, we have illustrated how our threshold cryp-
tography enabled access control mechanism can be used to en-
force policies that have multiple contextual conditions. We
also envision this mechanism being used in situations to in-
crease the conﬁdence in sensor readings by combining the
output of multiple sensors via the use of threshold cryptogra-
phy. We foresee context being used in conjunction with iden-
tity and group membership to provide ﬁner-grain access
control services, location-based encryption services and efﬁ-
cient key management for group communication.
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